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278 Abstract
This paper analyses the determinants of the changes in sovereign bond spreads in 
emerging European markets before and during the recent global ﬁ  nancial crisis. 
In particular, these determinants are associated with changes in market sentiment 
and in domestic macroeconomic fundamentals. The model was estimated on panel 
data for eight central and eastern European countries between Q1:2000 and 
Q2:2010, using least squares and controlling for serial correlation. The results 
show that the dynamics of spreads can be explained by both market sentiment in-
dicators and macroeconomic fundamentals. In particular, the external imbalances 
did not exert any discernible effect on spreads prior to the crisis, but became in-
creasingly signiﬁ  cant as the crisis broke out. 
Keywords: sovereign bond spreads, emerging markets, central and eastern Euro-
pe, global ﬁ  nancial crisis, market sentiment, macroeconomic fundamentals
1 INTRODUCTION
Funding costs for all Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) generally 
trended downward during most of the past decade.1 After a major deterioration of 
the global economy following the turbulence in the US sub-prime mortgage 
market and especially in the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers collapse, investors’ 
risk aversion increased signiﬁ  cantly, raising funding costs for CEECs. In addition, 
as investors started to differentiate among countries on the basis of perceived 
riskiness, the cost of ﬁ  nancing for some countries in the region increased signiﬁ  -
cantly, while for others the increase was much less pronounced.
From the economic policy perspective, it is important to identify and understand 
the driving forces of the sovereign spread dynamics, and to be aware of the relati-
ve contribution of the factors that can be inﬂ  uenced by economic policy tools, as 
well of those that cannot be affected by domestic policies. This paper tests to what 
extent the recent sharp widening of sovereign bond spreads could be attributed to 
changes in market sentiment or by domestic fundamentals, and also to external 
imbalances. Our model was estimated on panel data by using ordinary least squa-
res and including ﬁ  xed effects. The results suggest that the spread dynamics prior 
to the crisis can be explained only by market sentiment indicators and macroeco-
nomic fundamentals. The external imbalances did not exert any discernible effect 
on the spreads prior to the crisis, but became increasingly important after the crisis 
broke out.
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two provides a summary of 
the relevant literature discussing the determinants of sovereign bond spreads. Sec-
tions three and four describe some stylized facts about recent movements in sove-
reign bond spreads of CEECs, and describe the data used in the analysis and the 
potential impact of each variable on the spreads. This is followed by a description 
1 Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia.M
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279 of the model and the presentation of estimation results in Section ﬁ  ve. Section six 
concludes.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
The interest in the determinants of the cost of ﬁ  nancing is not new. It is common 
for this topic to become especially interesting in periods of turmoil in ﬁ  nancial 
markets and the real economy. In order to explain the behaviour of spreads, va-
rious authors have analyzed different macroeconomic fundamentals; government 
ﬁ  nance indicators; external liquidity indicators; political, social and legal factors; 
and ﬁ  nancial market variables. What is more, some authors have used credit rati-
ngs as a proxy for all available country fundamentals (e.g. Hartelius et al., 2008).
One of the ﬁ  rst authors to deal with this topic was Edwards (1983), who analyzed 
the relationship between foreign debt and country default risk. He showed that 
lenders took into account some of the risk characteristics of the borrowers, but 
also emphasized that markets were not successful in pricing risk for countries that 
eventually ended up with serious debt servicing difﬁ  culties. 
Using data of about one thousand bonds issued by developing countries, Eichen-
green and Mody (1998) tried to investigate how much of the spread variation 
could be explained by fundamental factors in comparison to the inﬂ  uence of the 
general market sentiment. According to their results, economic fundamentals did 
not seem to be the main driving force of spread movements over time, suggesting 
they were highly inﬂ  uenced by market sentiment. A similar conclusion was pre-
sented by Ebner (2009), who gave an overview of the development of euro-deno-
minated sovereign bonds in the CEE region, and showed that higher market vola-
tility is the most important factor inﬂ  uencing spreads.
A somewhat different result was reached by Ferrucci (2003), who investigated the 
determinants of emerging market bond spreads in secondary markets, and tried to 
discover how far the changes in spreads could be explained by changes in funda-
mentals. Using a panel of EMBI data and macroeconomic variables and the poo-
led mean group technique, he found that the spreads were highly inﬂ  uenced by the 
fundamentals, but that non-fundamental factors, especially market sentiment, 
could not be neglected.
In recent years, several papers have analysed the determinants of bond spreads for 
Central and Eastern European countries in the context of EU accession. Luengna-
ruemitchai and Schadler (2007) pointed out that EU accession might have a posi-
tive impact on spreads, an effect known as the “EU halo”. They did not model this 
effect explicitly, but concluded that it was the result of policy anchors brought by 
the EU accession process.M
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280 Nickel et al. (2009) focused their analysis on the impact of ﬁ  scal variables on 
bond spreads. They used forecasted values of macroeconomic variables to capture 
market expectations, and showed that the ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit had a signiﬁ  cant inﬂ  uence 
on bond spreads. However, in country-speciﬁ  c regressions they found that this 
link was not pronounced, as it could be conﬁ  rmed in only two out of ﬁ  ve emerging 
market countries. 
Alexopoulou et al. (2009) used a dynamic panel error correction model to analyze 
the role of fundamentals in the determination of government bond spreads for
eight new EU member states. They concluded that external imbalance, ﬁ  scal ba-
lance, the exchange rate, inﬂ  ation, the degree of trade openness and short-term 
interest rate spreads inﬂ  uenced the cost of funding in the long run. They divided 
countries in two sub-groups and emphasized the importance of ﬁ  scal fundamen-
tals for countries with high external imbalances.
As movements of spreads on different emerging market bonds usually have simi-
lar patterns, it could be concluded that they were to a large extent determined by 
one or more common factors. McGuire and Schrijvers (2003) used principal com-
ponent analysis to identify these factors, and found that a single common factor 
explained approximately 80% of the common variation. This factor is interpreted 
as investors’ risk aversion. There was also evidence of a second common factor 
appearing in recent years, but the authors do not link it to any fundamental expla-
nation. 
A similar approach was used by Sløk and Kennedy (2004), who differentiated 
between two main factors in explaining the changes in spreads: the perception of 
borrowers’ economic conditions; and the general economic conditions characteri-
zed by low global interest rates, which encouraged investors to go for a “yield 
hunt”, causing a sharp decrease of risk premia. One of their conclusions was that 
the role of general economic fundamentals, combined with the high global liqui-
dity, had greater inﬂ  uence on the lowering of spreads than the country-speciﬁ  c 
factors. Similar conclusions were also reached by Ciarlone et al. (2007), who 
showed that the emerging market spreads decreased more than they should have 
solely on the basis of improved fundamentals. This made many countries vulnera-
ble to sudden changes in ﬁ  nancial market conditions.
The empirical part of our paper is similar to the research done by Özatay et al. 
(2009), who used daily data and investigated the impact of US macroeconomic 
news and macroeconomic indicators on spread movements in 18 emerging market 
countries (only three of them were from Europe). They used ordinary least squares 
panel data estimation, but also expanded the analysis by the common correlated 
effects method. Their main conclusion was that the spreads were mainly determi-
ned by global ﬁ  nancial conditions in the long run. Positive domestic macroecono-
mic indicators contributed to the lower risk premia by decreasing the probability 
of default.M
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281 In summary, various authors have identiﬁ  ed market sentiment and macroecono-
mic fundamentals as the main determinants of spread movements. In addition, 
research on the new EU member states stressed the positive impact of the EU ac-
cession process. 
3 STYLIZED FACTS AND DATA
The spread on a bond represents investors’ perceptions of the issuers’ risk of de-
fault relative to some benchmark risk-free bond, taking into account the issuer’s 
past, current and future expected economic performance. In addition to affecting 
the cost of government debt, the spread is also an important reference for all pri-
vate sector loans, mostly because private issuers face the same macroeconomic 
risk as the sovereign. The spread is also used in cross-country studies as a measu-
re of country risk premium (see Damodaran, 2010). 
As shown in ﬁ  gure 1, the cost of foreign currency borrowing in international 
markets declined steadily for emerging market countries until the third quarter of 
2008. Measures of market sentiment such as VDAX (deﬁ  ned below) indicated 
that global investors saw the overall ﬁ  nancial market risks as sharply reduced. 
These trends were reversed in the second half of 2007 with the emergence of pro-
blems in the US sub-prime mortgage market. The escalation of the crisis after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 led to a ﬂ  ight to quality and a 
drastic rise in yields on emerging market Eurobonds. 
FIGURE 1
Spreads on emerging market sovereign bonds and ﬁ  nancial market volatility1 
1Spreads are measured by JP Morgan’s Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI); volatility by 
Deutsche Börse Volatility Index (VDAX).
Sources: JP Morgan; Bloomberg.
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282 After the drastic deterioration in market conditions, investors’ behaviour changed, 
the compression of spreads was quickly reversed, and major differences in sprea-
ds emerged among CEE countries. This region is of particular interest in this con-
text because it went through a period of rapid growth and increasing economic 
and ﬁ  nancial integration into the EU before the crisis. In some countries, this pro-
cess resulted in the build-up of signiﬁ  cant external imbalances, which were mo-
stly perceived by ﬁ  nancial markets as part of the convergence process, and at the 
time did not result in higher yields. This took place against the backdrop of relati-
vely benign international ﬁ  nancial conditions and abundant liquidity on the global 
level. However, these external conditions deteriorated dramatically as the crisis 
broke out. 
Our panel consists of data for eight CEECs for the period between the ﬁ  rst quarter 
of 2000 and the second quarter of 2010. Countries in our sample are: Bulgaria, 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. 
The data panel is not balanced because of the data availability problems. 
As indicators of yield spreads for the observed countries, for six countries from the 
sample we used the JP Morgan Euro EMBI Global indices, which represent an ave-
rage spread on long-term bonds not issued in local currency. These indices are con-
sidered to be reliable indicators of yield movements and total returns for emerging 
market bonds. To ensure their representative quality and mutual comparability, the 
EMBI indices include only euro-denominated, straight ﬁ  xed-coupon bonds issued 
by sovereign and quasi-sovereign entities with a remaining maturity of over 2.5 
years. In order to assure that prices of the instruments included are reliable, JP Mor-
gan requires that brokers and dealers in the secondary market regularly quote them. 
For the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the EMBI index was not available; the se-
ries for the Czech Republic start only from 2Q:2004 and end in Q4:2008, and for 
Slovakia there is no EMBI index. For these two countries, we calculated interest 
rate spreads on long-term government bonds used for the Maastricht interest rate 
criterion versus German government bonds of comparable maturity. It should be 
noted that these bond yield series are based on local currency bonds. This could 
pose problems when they are compared with EMBI spreads for other countries, as 
the latter are calculated for bonds denominated in foreign currency. In order to 
ensure that exchange rate risk was not neglected in the case of the Czech and Slo-
vakian bonds, we checked the 12-month forward premium for the Czech koruna 
and Slovak koruna versus the euro. As the appendix ﬁ  gure A1 shows, except at the 
beginning of the sample, when the foreign exchange market was pricing deprecia-
tion for the Czech koruna (around 1 per cent) and Slovak koruna (around 2 per 
cent), the premium remained in a narrow range around zero. Although this shows 
that the exchange rate risk would not be neglected by using the spreads on local 
currency bonds, we added the forward premium to the spreads to take account of 
the few instances when the exchange rate risk was present. This way we created M
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283 synthetic bonds denominated in foreign currency: investors would buy domestic 
bonds and insure against the exchange rate risk with a forward FX contract. In 
markets where arbitrage works, this synthetic bond would give the same rate of 
return as the equivalent bond denominated in foreign currency. 
The yield on an emerging market government bond is equal to the yield on a ben-
chmark risk-free bond such as the German or the US Treasury bond, plus the 
country risk premium. The risk premium is in turn determined by the probability 
of a country’s default and the expected rate of recovery of the face value of the 
bond. The size of these two spread components depends on the economic perfor-
mance of the country and the enforceability of international contracts. 
4 CHANNELS OF IMPACT
As ﬁ  gure 1 shows, changes in risk premia are too volatile to be explained by the 
above-mentioned factors alone. The premium also depends on investor sentiment, 
which might lead to an underestimation of risk in periods of ﬁ  nancial market up-
turn, and an overestimation in periods of downturn. This is the reason why resear-
chers regularly include some measure of market sentiment in studies of the deter-
minants of bond spreads. In this paper, we divide the explanatory variables into 
four groups: macroeconomic indicators; sovereign and external solvency indica-
tors; the EU convergence dummy; and measures of global ﬁ  nancial monetary sen-
timent. 2
4.1 MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS
The ﬁ  rst group of variables relates to macroeconomic indicators, which strongly 
affect investors’ perceptions of a country’s creditworthiness. The variables we use 
are real GDP growth rate and inﬂ  ation rate. GDP growth is the key measure of 
overall macroeconomic performance, and is positively correlated with tax reve-
nues, which are ultimately used to repay the debt (Cantor and Packer, 1996; Fer-
rucci, 2003). The rate of inﬂ  ation is another key measure of macroeconomic per-
formance. A higher rate of inﬂ  ation normally widens government bond spreads 
because it reduces the real value of government debt. 
Another macroeconomic variable of interest to investors is the real exchange rate. 
According to Ebner (2009), a stronger domestic currency makes it easier to repay 
external debt and therefore increases investors’ conﬁ  dence in the country, nar-
rowing the spreads. By analogy, a weaker domestic currency makes it more difﬁ  -
cult to repay external debt and therefore widens the bond spreads. 
4.2 SOVEREIGN RISK AND EXTERNAL SOLVENCY VARIABLES
The indicators of sovereign risk and external solvency that we consider include 
general government debt, external debt, short-term external debt, international 
reserves and the current account balance, all expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
2 See appendix 1 for details.M
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284 When investing in government bonds, investors are interested in the risk-return 
proﬁ  le of bonds, which depends on the government’s ability and willingness to 
repay the debt at maturity. Investing in government bonds is thus similar to inve-
sting in corporate bonds, with the difference that it is very difﬁ  cult or sometimes 
impossible to force governments into receivership. This is why investors look 
with great caution at macroeconomic fundamentals. Lower growth and higher ﬁ  -
scal deﬁ  cit increase the risk of bond default, and investors consequently require 
higher returns to hold such bonds. If a government issues too much debt, it has a 
greater incentive – or could be forced – to default if investors refuse to roll over 
the maturing debt. Hence, higher government debt increases the risk of default 
and the cost of debt.
External sustainability involves additional considerations. As well as the tax reve-
nues and the level of government debt, a country’s ability to issue bonds in foreign 
currency has an important role in the determination of bond spreads. Slowdowns 
and sudden stops in capital inﬂ  ows or outﬂ  ows of foreign capital increase the 
probability of a ﬁ  nancial crisis. This could manifest itself in prohibitively high 
borrowing costs on the international market, especially for countries that have 
depended on foreign funding for longer periods (see e.g. Ozkan and Unsal, 2010). 
Therefore countries with large current account deﬁ  cits and external debt, or high 
short-term external debt are, ceteris paribus, more vulnerable to external shocks 
than those with moderate external positions. By contrast, higher international re-
serves increase a country’s capacity to service its debts.
Sustainability of government and external debt depends on the GDP growth rate 
through a simple accounting identity: if interest payments on debt as a share of 
GDP become greater than the growth rate of nominal GDP, the level of debt has to 
increase (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996, pp. 63-66). This is not possible in the long 
run, as it would imply that a country can increase its indebtedness without limit. 
Therefore we expect a negative and signiﬁ  cant relationship between GDP growth 
and sovereign bond spreads. Similarly, we expect a positive relationship between 
the level of public debt and external vulnerability indicators on the one hand and 
bond spreads on the other.
4.3 EU/EUROZONE CONVERGENCE PROCESS
The third factor we used as a potential explanation of spread movements is an 
indicator of EU and eurozone convergence. Countries in our sample have either 
ﬁ  nished their EU accession process or are on the way to the EU or EMU. There-
fore it makes sense to consider how this process may have inﬂ  uenced market 
perceptions of country risk. Accession to the EU and the eurozone implies, among 
other things, that investor protection and the rule of law are considered to be at a 
very high level. Although eurozone membership proved insufﬁ  cient to discipline 
member states, as seen from the example of Greece, or shelter them from negative 
market sentiment (except maybe in the early days of the monetary union), for the M
I
R
N
A
 
D
U
M
I
Č
I
Ć
,
 
T
O
M
I
S
L
A
V
 
R
I
D
Z
A
K
:
D
E
T
E
R
M
I
N
A
N
T
S
 
O
F
 
S
O
V
E
R
E
I
G
N
 
R
I
S
K
 
P
R
E
M
I
A
 
F
O
R
 
E
U
R
O
P
E
A
N
 
E
M
E
R
G
I
N
G
 
M
A
R
K
E
T
S
F
I
N
A
N
C
I
A
L
 
T
H
E
O
R
Y
 
A
N
D
 
P
R
A
C
T
I
C
E
3
5
 
(
3
)
 
2
7
7
-
2
9
9
 
(
2
0
1
1
)
285 observed group of countries it can be expected that EU and eurozone accession 
improves the overall credibility and quality of macroeconomic policies. This 
should be in turn manifested in lower spreads on government bonds. To take ac-
count of this effect we constructed a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
when the country becomes an EU member. 
4.4 GLOBAL RISK AVERSION AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Unlike bonds issued by major advanced economies, which usually serve as safe 
havens for investors in periods of ﬁ  nancial turbulence, emerging markets bonds 
usually lose their value in times of crisis and behave like equities. Erb et al. (2000) 
explore the risk and return characteristics of emerging market bonds using the 
EMBI index and show a very high correlation (around 0.8) with the S&P 500 in-
dex and emerging market equity indices. Many studies therefore use volatility 
indices calculated on developed market equity indices as proxies for investor sen-
timent (e.g. Hartelius et al., 2010; Ebner, 2009; Luengnaruemitchai and Schadler, 
2007).
The most widely used equity market volatility index is the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange Volatility Index (VIX). It measures implied volatility of the S&P 500 
index option prices, and is often used as an indicator of global ﬁ  nancial market 
sentiment. In a way similar to VIX, the Deutsche Boerse calculates the DAX vo-
latility index, which shows implied volatility of equity prices for the German 
market. We use this volatility index as it might be more appropriate for the Euro-
pean countries studied in this paper. Like the VIX, this index pointed to low vola-
tility in the German equity market between 2004 and 2008. Also, it rose sharply at 
the onset of the crisis in September 2008. The VDAX is expected to be positively 
correlated with the risk premium on emerging market bonds.
We also constructed an additional dummy variable (CRISIS_DAX), which takes 
on the value of 1 when the VDAX index exceeds the sum of sample mean (25.8) 
and one sample standard deviation (10.3, see ﬁ  gure 2). The rationale for this va-
riable is to identify periods when global markets were in a state of greater uncer-
tainty, and thus facilitate the interpretation of interaction terms presented bellow, 
whose purpose is to model possible non-linear relationships between bond spre-
ads and their determinants during the crisis. 
In order to assess to what extent bond spreads dispersed after September 2008 as 
a result of investors’ differentiation among countries, in a few speciﬁ  cations we 
included in the model interaction terms between the changes in the VDAX index 
and the crisis dummy or external vulnerability indicators. Special attention is gi-
ven to external imbalances, which could be important in assessing the debt-servi-
cing ability of many countries in the region. The interaction terms might pick up 
some non-linearity that could exist between external imbalances and market sen-
timent. The intuition behind this approach is that markets might ignore external M
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286 vulnerabilities in periods of low volatility, but start paying attention to them in 
periods of heightened volatility. 
FIGURE 2
Deutsche Boerse VDAX index 
Sources: Bloomberg; authors’ calculations.
As an alternative measure of market sentiment and global risk aversion we used 
the difference between the yield to maturity on high-grade European non-ﬁ  nancial 
corporate bonds (AAA) and the yield to maturity on comparable generic German 
government bonds. 
We also used the ECB reference rate as an indicator of general ﬁ  nancing condi-
tions. Ebner (2009) emphasizes that a rate hike increases investors’ risk aversion, 
and therefore reduces exposure to riskier markets, thereby widening government 
bond spreads for such countries. A higher reference rate could also reduce the 
ability of debtor countries to service their external debt, thereby widening the 
bond spreads.
Table 1 summarizes basic descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regres-
sions. Before conducting the regression we checked the stationarity of all varia-
bles, and the series were differenced where needed. GDP and current account ba-
lances were seasonally adjusted, as in some countries they exhibit strong seasonal 
patterns. 
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287 TABLE 1
Descriptive statistics
 
Quar-
terly 
change 
in spre-
ad
Annual 
GDP 
growth 
rate 
(percen-
tage 
points)
Annual 
CPI 
growth 
rate 
(percen-
tage 
points)
Current 
account 
balance 
(% of 
GDP)
Quar-
terly 
change 
in share 
of exter-
nal debt 
in GDP 
Change 
in share 
of inter-
national 
reserves 
in GDP 
Quartely 
change 
in share 
of gen. 
gov. debt 
in GDP 
Quar-
terly 
change 
in real 
exchan-
ge rate 
indeks
Quartely 
change 
in 
VDAX
Change 
in ECB 
rate
Mean -0.32 3.74 5.58 -4.75 1.42 0.18 0.09 0.63 -0.17 -0.06
Median -2.40 4.40 4.00 -4.09 1.00 0.05 -0.10 0.74 -1.14 0.00
Maximum 539.28 13.40 49.00 7.15 20.53 16.14 10.30 8.91 32.24 0.75
Minimum -253.37 -15.90 -1.30 -23.93 -6.94 -9.46 -8.30 -14.76 -13.79 -1.75
Std. Dev. 66.42 3.69 6.53 5.58 3.25 2.04 1.99 3.15 7.91 0.41
Observations 294 336 344 344 228 296 317 336 336 336
Source: Authors’ calculations.
5 ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 
According to the above considerations, we estimated the following equation:
t i
j
jt j t i
j
t i j j
j
t i j j i t i u R E S M spread , 4 , 3 ) , ( 2 ) , ( 1 , + + + + + = ∆ ∑ ∑ ∑ β β β β α
where the residuals are represented by an AR(1) process:
t i t i t i e u u , 1 , , + = − ρ
where Mj(i,t) is a matrix with macroeconomic indicators j in rows and values for 
country i at time t in columns; Sj(i,t) is the equivalent matrix of solvency and sove-
reign risk indicators; Ei,t is the EU convergence dummy for country i at time t; and 
Rj,t is a vector of market sentiment indicators (the VDAX index, corporate spread 
or the crisis dummy). 
Because of the relatively short time series and missing observations at the begin-
ning of the sample, we estimated this data panel with ordinary least squares and 
included country ﬁ  xed effects αi, which should account for all unobserved country 
heterogeneity. This is a common approach to explaining the determinants of spre-
ads in cross-country studies (see Özatay et al., 2009, and references therein). 
However, the chi-square test showed that the ﬁ  xed effects were redundant. This is 
theoretically plausible because we are estimating determinants of spreads, so one 
would think that investors would react similarly to changes in fundamentals in M
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288 each country, although the country-speciﬁ  c spread might be different and inﬂ  uen-
ced by many variables.
Considering the nature of our data, errors among the countries (cross sections) 
could be correlated, implying that large errors for one country will often be asso-
ciated with large errors for another country in quarter t, for example, when during 
the crisis all spreads increase simultaneously. To account for this estimation pro-
blem we used robust standard errors suggested by Beck and Katz (1995) that ac-
count for cross-sectional correlation and heteroskedasticity.3 
An additional problem with our model is serial correlation of the residuals (within 
cross-section), which makes least squares estimates biased. Hence, similarly to 
Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) we included an AR(1) speciﬁ  cation for the residuals, 
which proved adequate according to the autocorrelation tests for residuals. 
Table 2 shows the estimation results for several speciﬁ  cations in order to assess 
the robustness of results. Four speciﬁ  cations differ in the variable used as a proxy 
for the global ﬁ  nancial market conditions and the use of interaction terms to de-
scribe a non-linear link between external vulnerability indicators and change in 
government spread. The ﬁ  rst two speciﬁ  cations use the VDAX; and the third and 
fourth use the spread on European non-ﬁ  nancial corporate bonds. 
Estimation results broadly conﬁ  rm the postulated relationships between various 
explanatory variables and the sovereign bond spreads. 
TABLE 2
Estimation results
Eq Name:
Speciﬁ  cation
1234
Dep. Var: Change in government spreads
Constant
-7,119 -5,654 4,476 8,275
[7.50] [6.59] [6.59] [5.45]
GDP growth
-4,599 -5,107 -5,24 -5,904
[2.08]* [1.93]** [1.83]** [1.65]**
CPI growth
3,41 3,878 0,527 0,476
[1.71]* [1.46]** [1.49] [1.28]
3 Using Monte Carlo studies, Beck and Katz (1995) showed that applying the OLS to panel data and cor-
recting the errors for cross-sectional correlation and heteroskedasticity produces more efficient results than 
using feasible generalized least squares, which might lead to overconfidence by producing artificially low 
standard errors.M
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289 Current account 
balance (% of GDP)
-0,649 -0,663  
[0.73] [0.60]  
Change in share of 
external debt in GDP
-0,586 -0,232  
[1.33] [1.08]  
Change in share of 
international reserves 
in GDP
-8,549 -7,105 -6,809 -4,502
[2.25]** [1.91]** [2.25]** [1.93]*
Change in share of 
gen. gov. debt in GDP
2,852 4,071  
[2.56] [2.42]  
Change in real exc-
hange rate index
1,211 -0,121 2,43 1,045
[1.57] [1.46] [1.38] [1.28]
EU dummy
-2,885 2,949 -8,229 1,48
[12.78] [11.44] [10.94] [9.32]
Change in VDAX
3,753 1,641   
[0.57]** [0.61]**  
Change in ECB rate
-34,332 -27,979 -1,141 0,904
[13.89]* [12.94]* [12.81] [11.09]
Δ(VDAX)×(share of 
CAB in GDP)
-0,314  
[0.08]**  
Δ(VDAX)×(change in 
gen. gov. debt in GDP)
0,37  
[0.15]*  
Δ(VDAX)×(change in 
ext. debt in GDP)
0,313  
 [0.11]**    
Change in corporate 
spreads (ΔCorp)
   1,035 0,618
[0.11]** [0.11]**
ΔCorp×(share of 
CAB in GDP)
-0,056
[0.01]**
ΔCorp×(change in 
gen. gov. debt in GDP)
0,065
[0.02]**
ΔCorp×(change in 
ext. debt in GDP)
0,067
    [0.02]**
Observations 193 193 193 193
R-squared 0,55 0,60 0,64 0,69
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* Indicates 5% significance level; ** indicates 1% significance level.
Source: Authors’ calculations.M
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290 Based on Speciﬁ  cation 2, a 1 percentage point higher GDP growth rate lowers 
spreads on average by 5 basis points. A 1 percentage point higher inﬂ  ation widens 
the spreads on average by 4 basis points. Reserves held by the central bank are 
also important; increasing reserves by 1 percentage point of GDP decreases spre-
ads on average by 7 basis points. Thus, it seems that markets indeed rewarded 
growing economies in which inﬂ  ation is under control with lower sovereign bond 
spreads.
In contrast to the results of Luengnaruemitchai and Schadler (2007) our estimates 
of the EU dummy are statistically insigniﬁ  cant in all speciﬁ  cations. This suggests 
that the EU accession process had no noticeable impact on changes in government 
bond spreads of CEE countries. Also, somewhat surprisingly, the change of real 
effective exchange rate exerts no signiﬁ  cant inﬂ  uence on the spreads.
With the exception of changes in reserves to GDP, our regression results suggest 
that external vulnerability indicators have not been signiﬁ  cant determinants of 
sovereign bond spreads. However, as the interaction terms show, in crisis periods 
the current account balance, changes in external and in government debt become 
statistically signiﬁ  cant in explaining the spreads. If VDAX jumps by 10 percenta-
ge points and if the share of general government debt in GDP increases by 5 per-
centage points the model suggests that spreads on average increase by 19 basis 
points (estimates from speciﬁ  cation 2). 
Variations in the VDAX index and corporate bond spreads have a strong inﬂ  uence 
on the dynamics of sovereign bond spreads even without interaction terms. Chan-
ges in spreads can be attributed to a large extent to changes in this variable – on 
average a 1 percentage point increase in the VDAX widens the spreads by 4 basis 
points (speciﬁ  cation 1) and a 1 basis point increase in average corporate spread in 
the Euro area increases government spread on average by 1 basis point (speciﬁ  ca-
tion 3). 
Results are broadly stable across all speciﬁ  cations and there is no signiﬁ  cant diffe-
rence in magnitude or signiﬁ  cance of the estimated coefﬁ  cients, except for the 
change in ECB rate, which is signiﬁ  cant in speciﬁ  cations 1 and 2 but not in speci-
ﬁ  cations 3 and 4. We believe that the speciﬁ  cations 2 and 4 (with interaction terms) 
explain the real data generating process better, due to the non-linear effects captu-
red by the interaction terms. R-squared statistics are broadly similar across speciﬁ  -
cations but it should be noted that the speciﬁ  cations with interaction terms explain 
more variation of the dependent variable in the sample used in this research. 
For a better comparison of the quantitative impact of four groups of variables on 
spread changes, tables 3 and 4 show the contributions of statistically signiﬁ  cant 
variables to the modelled spread changes in two periods, using speciﬁ  cation 4. 
Table 3 shows the main drivers of the spread changes between Q1:2007 and M
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291 Q3:2008. In this period, GDP for the economies in our sample was still expan-
ding, and one could expect that the main determinant of the widening of spreads 
was instability in the global ﬁ  nancial market, where turbulence started in August 
2007. The results in table 3 conﬁ  rm this, as macroeconomic factors still contribu-
ted to spread compression, but the spreads widened due to worsening in market 
sentiment and also due to the rise in the European corporate spreads and markets’ 
concern about external vulnerabilities and the government ﬁ  scal stance.
TABLE 3
Contributions to the modelled spread changes from Q1:2007 to Q3:2008 (bps) 
Macroeconomic factors -105 
External vulnerability & government ﬁ  nance indicators 11
European corporate spreads 71 
Modelled spread change 77 
Actuall spread change   58
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table 4 shows the main drivers of the spread changes from the third quarter of 
2008 to the second quarter of 2009. In terms of contributions to modelled spreads, 
in this period, contrary to the previous period, macroeconomic fundamentals con-
tributed to spread expansion as recession worsened the macroeconomic funda-
mentals. On the positive side, the contracting economy also lowered external vul-
nerabilities (current account deﬁ  cits). Borrowing costs for European ﬁ  rms were 
very high after the markets froze when Lehman Brothers went in to Chapter 11 in 
September 2008, but as the panic abated the borrowing costs decreased, which 
decreased spreads directly and through interaction terms (speciﬁ  cation 4). Unlike 
in the previous period when spreads increased due to ﬁ  nancial market-related va-
riables (European corporate spreads) and external vulnerabilities in this period the 
spreads increased due to worsening fundamentals while the above two factors 
contributed to the spread compression in the period from Q3:2008 to Q1:2009. 
TABLE 4
Contributions to modelled spread changes from Q3:2008 to Q2:2009 (bps) 
Macroeconomic factors 76 
External vulnerability & government ﬁ  nance indicators -79 
European corporate spreads -62
Modelled spread change -65 
Actuall spread change   -18 
Source: Authors’ calculations.M
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292 In summary, after a period of optimism marked by the emphasis on the positive 
aspects of the convergence process in emerging Europe, the tide turned in late 
2008 and investors’ attention turned towards imbalances that were built up before 
the crisis. For instance, the IMF GFSR (October 2007) identiﬁ  ed macroeconomic 
vulnerabilities in a number of emerging European countries that could lead to a 
cut-off in external ﬁ  nancing in the event of a deterioration in the external environ-
ment. By their nature, macroeconomic indicators are less volatile than ﬁ  nancial 
variables and, as expected, have a smaller impact on short-term changes in yield 
spreads. For example, a GDP growth of 2.3 per cent (one sample standard devia-
tion) would lower the spreads on average roughly by 14 basis points in the studied 
period. On the other hand, increase in European corporate spreads by 70 basis 
points (one sample standard deviation) increases the spreads on average by 43 
basis points, which is three times more. After the initial increase in spreads for 
European emerging economies caused by the market turmoil, the worsening ma-
croeconomic indicators contributed signiﬁ  cantly to higher spreads in the latter 
period, when the impact of market turmoil slowly started abating. 
5 CONCLUSION
The main conclusion of this research is that spread changes for bonds issued by 
selected emerging countries from Central and Eastern Europe are affected by both 
market sentiment and macroeconomic fundamentals. In the same time, external 
imbalances were not shown to have any signiﬁ  cant effect on spreads prior to the 
crisis, but became increasingly signiﬁ  cant as the crisis broke out. Somewhat sur-
prisingly, the EU and eurozone convergence process turned out not to be a signi-
ﬁ  cant determinant of spread movements. 
The inﬂ  uence of variables that proxy ﬁ  nancial market sentiment is particularly 
important for the explanation of sudden moves in spreads in the short run, as the 
ﬁ  nancial market environment can change abruptly. Therefore, it could be conclu-
ded that deterioration in the global ﬁ  nancial market might negatively affect even 
countries with sound macroeconomic indicators and prudent ﬁ  scal policy, mea-
ning that factors that domestic policymakers cannot affect could result in a signi-
ﬁ  cant increase in the cost of external ﬁ  nancing. 
The results presented in this paper also imply that there was a signiﬁ  cant non-li-
near link between external imbalances and increases in spreads in the observed 
countries. The countries that had higher external deﬁ  cits experienced much larger 
increases in their spreads. It seems there was a tendency among investors to group 
countries of similar characteristics from the same geographical region before the 
crisis, but this effect vanished during the crisis, as the focus of international inve-
stors and analysts shifted from the beneﬁ  ts of the convergence process to the ex-
ternal vulnerabilities of individual countries. This means that the countries with 
high external vulnerabilities (including Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania and 
Romania) enjoyed an extended period of favourable borrowing terms, which qui-M
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293 ckly reversed after the crisis broke out. From the macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial 
stability perspectives, it should be noted that the period of low ﬁ  nancing costs had 
contributed to the build-up of signiﬁ  cant imbalances and misallocation of resour-
ces in some of these countries. M
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294 APPENDIX
FIGURE A1
Exchange rates and forward premia for the Czech koruna and Slovak koruna
Sources: Eurostat; Bloomberg.
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295 TABLE A1 
Data description and sources
Variable Source Description
Dependant variable
Spread
Bloomberg, 
Eurostat.
JP Morgan Euro EMBI Global indices for all co-
untries, except for the Czech Republic and Slova-
kia for which we calculated the interest rate spre-
ads on long term government bonds used for Ma-
astricht criteria versus German government bonds 
of comparable maturity. Please ﬁ  nd more detailed 
explanation in the text on pages 7 and 8. Quarterly 
averages of daily data were used.
Group 1 – Macroeconomic indicators
GDP Eurostat. Annual rate of change.
CPI Eurostat. Annual rate of change.
Exchange rate BIS. Effective exchange rate indices.
Group 2 – Sovereign and external solvency variables
Current account 
balance / GDP
Eurostat.
As the data frequency is quarterly, in order to re-
move systematic calendar related variation asso-
ciated with the time of the year, the X-11 seasonal 
adjustment method developed by U.S. Census 
Bureau was used to smooth the GDP and the cu-
rrent account data. 
External debt / 
GDP
The Quarterly 
External Debt 
Database, World 
Bank and IMF; 
Eurostat.
 
International re-
serves / GDP
Eurostat.
The level of international reserves at the end of 
each period was devided by GDP moving average 
of four past quarters.
General 
government debt / 
GDP
Eurostat.  
Group 3 – EU accession process
EU dummy
Authors’ 
calculation.
The EU dummy variable has a value of 1 in peri-
ods when a country is a memebr of the EU. Ot-
herwise it is 0.M
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296 Group 4 – Global risk perception
VDAX Bloomberg.
The VDAX volatility index is provided by Deuts-
che Boerse and presents an indication of the 
expected volatility of the DAX stock index for the 
next thirty days. It is calculated by using the DAX 
options that are traded on the Eurex electronic tra-
ding system. Quarterly averages of daily data 
were used.
CRISIS
Authors’ 
calculation.
The CRISIS variable has a value of 1 if average 
quarterly value of VDAX index exceeds one stan-
dard deviation above its average value marked du-
ring the whole observed period. Otherwise it is 0.
Corporate spread
Merryll Lynch, 
Bloomberg, aut-
hors’ calculation.
The difference between yield to maturity on Euro-
pean non ﬁ  nancial generic corporate bonds with 
maturity between 1 and 10 years and the yield to 
maturity on a comparable generic German gover-
nment bond. M
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